TERRORISM STRATEGIES. AN ATTEMPT AT CONCEPTUALISATION

Carl von Clausevitz, in his classic definition of strategy, described it as the science of using battles for purposes of war\(^2\). Terrorism is well researched both at the “battle” level (referred to here as a concrete assassination attempt)\(^3\) as well as the ultimate goal (which is an ideological motivation)\(^4\). Relatively the weakest recognition is given to the level of strategy defining how terrorist attacks are supposed to lead to the realisation of the ultimate goal. This is understandable, as only in a few cases have terrorist organisations been able to achieve their goal partly (Irish Republican Army) or temporarily (Islamic State)\(^5\). Also in theory, terrorists rarely present a coherent strategy. The few visions they have presented for achieving the ultimate goal are generally very broad, which is a natural consequence of the mismatch between the small forces and ambitious targets of terrorist

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1 Jarosław Tomasiewicz: hab. doctor, professor of the University of Silesia, employee at the Institute of History at the University of Silesia. Researcher of extremism and political violence. Author of many publications, e.g.: Terroryzm na tle przemocy politycznej (Terrorism against the background of political violence) (2000), Zło w imię dobra. Zjawisko przemocy w polityce (Evil in the name of good. Violence in politics) (2009), Naprawa czy zniszczenie demokracji. Tendencje autorytarne i profaszystowskie w polskiej myśli politycznej (1921-1935) (Repair or destruction of democracy? Authoritarian and profascist tendencies in the Polish political thought: 1921-1935) (2012). Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Polish National Security Association, member of the Programme Council of the Centre for Terrorism Research.


5 I refer to all groups and informal movements whose followers use terrorism both as a primary and secondary method as terrorists. I use the concept of terrorism as defined in the article. Tomasiewicz J, Od skrytościośwta do miatieżwojny. Ewolucja terroryzmu politycznego w Europie—aspekty ideologiczne, taktyczne i organizacyjne. Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 2014, No. 11.
organisations. The Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) has openly proclaimed the “primacy of practice”, recognising that the reality of armed resistance can only be tested in action\textsuperscript{6}. Terrorists are also generally characterised by hypocrisy, ordering them to mask criminal practices with lofty slogans. In this situation, we are doomed to reconstruct the terrorists’ strategic plan on the basis of both their declarations and actions. With the input (\textit{i.e.} tactics) and the output (\textit{i.e.} target) we must reconstruct the intermediate stages.

The aim of the study is to develop assumptions that will serve the analysis of a long-term terrorist strategy. Of course, it is an initial and provisional proposal of a tool, the creation of which requires further, preferably collaborative, research. The analytical schema presented here should be developed, supplemented, specified and modified with the broadest possible historical, geographical and ideological comparative material. It is particularly important to maintain a historical perspective, as the analysis of long-term trends—and not just the current situation—allows for the extrapolation of the future\textsuperscript{7}.

Some preliminary assumptions should be made for this task. First of all, we must break with the perception of terrorists as irrational psychopaths (some treat terrorism as a fascination with evil, a manifestation of mental illness and primary wildness)\textsuperscript{8}. However, without denying the fact that the psycho- and sociopathic element is over-represented in terrorist groups, it must be assumed that terrorists act rationally within their logic (even if this is sometimes a secondary rationalisation). To paraphrase Clausevitz, terrorism is a war waged by other means. The assumption about the irrationalism of terrorists corresponds to the statement that the aim of terrorists is to intimidate the enemy\textsuperscript{9}. This is also a misunderstanding—intimidation is only a means leading to a real goal. Therefore we cannot ignore the ideological factor, sometimes treated as a kind of smokescreen, that conceals the real (in the guise: mundane) motives of terrorists. Let us remember that a person who risks or even sacrifices his or her freedom, health, or even life needs a strong motivation, and this is what ideology can provide\textsuperscript{10}. In addition, ideology to a large extent determines not only strategy, but also tactics (\textit{e.g.} the choice of the object of attack and, consequently, the methods of action). Finally, the importance of conspiracy theories should not be overestimated,


\textsuperscript{7} On the application of trajectory theory to terrorism, see more in: Tomasiewicz J, Trajektoria współczesnego terroryzmu międzynarodowego — nowe wyzwania. Studia Lubuskie, 2016, Vol. 12. Based on past experience, it is possible, for example, to predict an increase in the amount of ecological terrorism in the near future.


\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 41; Bolechów B, Terroryzm w świecie podwubiegunowym. Toruń, 2003, p. 35

\textsuperscript{10} Although of course this is not the only motivation—such motivation may be material benefits or, for example, personal revenge.
as they see terrorism as “a slow tool in the hands” of the the KGB\textsuperscript{11} or the CIA\textsuperscript{12} – although the links between terrorists and the secret services are undeniable, subversive groups have usually tried to achieve their own goals\textsuperscript{13}.

The final goal

The ultimate goal of terrorists is determined by their ideology. The ideology defines values (the desired vision of the world), diagnoses the situation by presenting and explaining the picture of reality (\textit{e.g.} identifying the enemy), and finally shows the possibility of transition from the existing to the desired state (which includes the justification for violence). It may be suspected that in some cases the ultimate goal is of a declarative nature, \textit{i.e.} the terrorists themselves do not believe in its full implementation, but nevertheless it should be treated as if it were a real goal. Sometimes the achievement of a partial or phased objective (like the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland in 1998) may satisfy the terrorists\textsuperscript{14}, but in other cases, it becomes a starting point for further escalation (the overthrow of the Frankish dictatorship in Spain only intensified the terror of Eucadi Ta Askatasuna\textsuperscript{15}).

Terrorists can set themselves the following goals:

C1. \textbf{anarchy}: destruction of the apparatus of power (\textit{e.g.} classic 19th/20th century anarchists\textsuperscript{16});

C2. \textbf{revolution}: seizure of power and change of regime within a state (\textit{e.g.} Партія соціалістів-революціонерів in Russia\textsuperscript{17}) or even a group of states (\textit{e.g.} Daesh\textsuperscript{18});

C3. \textbf{separation/irredentism}: separation of part of the territory of a State (\textit{e.g.} ETA or IRA\textsuperscript{19});

\textsuperscript{11} Sterling C, Sieć terroru. Warsaw, 1990.
\textsuperscript{17} Pipes R, Rewolucja rosyjska. Warsaw, 1994, pp. 116–119.
\textsuperscript{18} Hanne O, Flichy de La Neuville T, Państwo Islamskie. Warsaw, 2015.
\textsuperscript{19} Tomasiewicz J, Współczesne ruchy regionalistyczne w Europie zachodniej. \textit{Sprawy Narodowościowe}, 1997, No. 2.
C4. **reform**: (through political or economic concessions by the authorities) of the prevailing system or correction of its policies (*inter alia*, certain groups of the western European extreme left\(^\text{20}\), Mexican Zapatista rebels\(^\text{21}\), Movimiento 19 de Abril in Colombia\(^\text{22}\));

C5. **defense of the status quo**: *i.e.* the prevailing socio-political system and/or balance of power (*e.g.* Black Sotnia in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century\(^\text{23}\), the Ku-Klux-Klan in the USA\(^\text{24}\), Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria in Italy in the 1970s\(^\text{25}\));

C6. **Fifth column**: weakening of enemy forces in order to enable the ally to take over the control of another area [C2, C3] (*e.g.* West German Rote Armee Fraktion fighting in the name of solidarity with the Vietnamese and Palestinian Revolution\(^\text{26}\)) or facilitating external intervention (*e.g.* German diversionary groups in Poland in 1939\(^\text{27}\));

C7. **cultural hegemony**: change of social awareness without the necessary change of the political system (*e.g.* Animal Liberation Front\(^\text{28}\));

C8. **lack of positive goal**: retaliation (*e.g.* Wehrwolf\(^\text{29}\)), self-fulfillment (*e.g.* insurrectionists-nihilists\(^\text{30}\)) etc. One of the Italian right-wing terrorists, Mario Tuti, mentioned: “When we grabbed our weapons [...] we knew perfectly well that we had no chance of winning”; another neo-fascist said that “armed action is simply a demonstration of existence”\(^\text{31}\).

To achieve these goals, terrorism can be a primary or secondary method (supporting *e.g.* regular war, armed uprising, rural guerrilla, coup d’état, civil disobedience or even elections). In practice, this strategy is a result of the intentions and capabilities of the terrorists—sometimes terrorism was simply a substitute for rural guerrillas or armed uprisings, as


\(^{31}\) Cento Bull A, Cooke P, Ending Terrorism in Italy, Abingdon—New York 2013, p. 92, 94. The motivation to fight the neo-fascists found in the heroic “spirit of the legionary”. *Spirito legionario*, “Quex (la rivista dei carcerati nazional-rivoluzionari)”, 1980, No. 3.
evidenced by the examples of Irish Phoenicians, Croatian mouths, EOKA in Cyprus, and left-wing terrorists in Brazil and Uruguay\textsuperscript{32}.

**Terrorist attack**

These objectives are pursued by terrorists through terrorist attacks, which can be either a single act or a whole complex of acts carried out simultaneously or sequentially. An example of the first case is the attack by Chechen terrorists on the Moscow theatre in Dubrovka in 2002\textsuperscript{33}, the second is “Bloody Wednesday” on 15 August 1906 (attacks by PPS militias in 19 cities)\textsuperscript{34}, and the third is the two assaults initiated by Anders Breivik on 22 July 2011\textsuperscript{35}. An assassination can be carried out by one person, a team of people or a number of teams working in parallel\textsuperscript{36}. Sometimes the people who make the decision to carry out the assassination attempt are the attackers (jihadist “lone wolves”, insurrectionists), in other cases, the roles of the decision-maker and the performer are separated\textsuperscript{37}. Nevertheless, even the “lone wolves” are usually part of a broader movement, to which they are connected by an ideological bond. Assassinations are usually planned and prepared in advance, but they also occur spontaneously.

The target of the assassination may be people, animals (although terrorists have not carried out such actions so far, but there have been criminal actions of this type)\textsuperscript{38}, material objects (mainly public—infrastructural or symbolic—but also private property) and information resources. The criteria for the selection of the object are: spectacularity, severity and, last but not least, accessibility. In order to carry out an attack, terrorists


\textsuperscript{33} Kraj K, Rosja w walce z terroryzmem. Krakow, 2009, pp. 84–86.

\textsuperscript{34} Pająk J, Organizacje bojowe partii politycznych w Królestwie Polskim 1904–1911. Warsaw, 1985, pp. 146–147.

\textsuperscript{35} Tomaszewicz J, Nowa populistyczna prawica jako źródło zagrożenia terrorystycznego w Europie. *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, 2013, No. 9.


\textsuperscript{37} While we may consider the contractor to be a direct perpetrator, the organisation to which he belongs or the movement with which he identifies himself will be referred to as an indirect perpetrator.

use cold weapons\textsuperscript{39}, firearms\textsuperscript{40}, explosives\textsuperscript{41}, means of transport (car\textsuperscript{43}, ship\textsuperscript{44}, plane\textsuperscript{45}), information technology (viruses, logic bombs, Trojans, DDoS and others\textsuperscript{46}), and unconventional weapons (including chemical and biological weapons\textsuperscript{47}).

We can distinguish between the following types of offensive actions carried out by terrorists\textsuperscript{48}:

Z1. assassinations (assassination, mutilation, abduction) of elite representatives (political, military, religious, business leaders) – e.g. the assassination of President Anwar Sadat by jihadists in 1981\textsuperscript{49} or the kidnapping of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978\textsuperscript{50};

Z2. assassinations of officers of the power apparatus (e.g. the murders by Mohamed Mahamed Maharah in 2012\textsuperscript{51} but also economic institutions (Red Brigades in Italy)\textsuperscript{52}, information (jihadist attack on “Charlie Hebdo”)\textsuperscript{53},


\textsuperscript{40} Wojtasik K, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 80–83.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 61–63.

\textsuperscript{42} Armed Struggle in Italy 1976-78—a chronology, bdw, 2008, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{43} Wojtasik K, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 96–97.


\textsuperscript{48} It is worth considering whether acts of self-destruction such as Yukio Mishima’s ritual suicide after the failed coup in 1970 (Albery N, Nobuko Albery pozdrowia ducha Mishimy, powieściopisarza samobójcy. \textit{Literatura na Świecie}, 1989, No. 3; see: Mishima Y, Piękna śmierć. \textit{Fronda}, 1995, No. 4–5) or the self-immolation of Buddhist monks in Vietnam (Dmochowski A, Wietnam - wojna bez zwycięzców. Cracow, 1991, p. 82) can be classified as one more type of assassination. Although we are not dealing here with intimidation of the recipient, the psychological effect is comparable.


religious (Forghan group in Iran)\textsuperscript{54}, and even educational (Taliban in Afghanistan)\textsuperscript{55};

Z3. assaults on private representatives of the “hostile” community (e.g. the IRA attack on a bar in the Protestant district of Belfast on 23 May 1970\textsuperscript{56}, the attack by Brenton Tarrant on a mosque in Christchurch on 15 March 2019\textsuperscript{57});

Z4. assaults on random people (most jihadist attacks in Europe and North America)\textsuperscript{58};

Z5. destruction of infrastructure objects (industrial\textsuperscript{59}, energy\textsuperscript{60}, communication\textsuperscript{61}, administrative\textsuperscript{62}, commercial\textsuperscript{63}, scientific\textsuperscript{64}, educational\textsuperscript{65} and even entertainment\textsuperscript{66}) or private property of the opponent (e.g. flats or cars\textsuperscript{67}) as well as the destruction of information resources and the disruption of the flow of information\textsuperscript{68};

Z6. Destruction of symbolic objects (Alsatian separatists attacked the monument to Marshal Turenne in Strasbourg in 1975\textsuperscript{69}, the assassination of Breton separatists at Versailles Palace in 1978\textsuperscript{70});

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{56} Gruszka W, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 148.
\bibitem{58} Wojtasik K, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 31–58, 96–118.
\bibitem{60} Smith B.L, Terrorism in America. New York, 1994, p. 27.
\bibitem{62} Bombiarze łódzcy skazani. \textit{Ilustrowana Republika}, 1933, No. 32.
\bibitem{64} Foreman D, Wyznania wojownika Ziemi. Łódź, 2004, p. 176.
\bibitem{66} Armed..., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 24, 44, 57, 65.
\bibitem{67} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 100.
\bibitem{70} Nationalists were largely behind the bombing of national monuments..., UPI. \textit{Electronic source: https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/12/08/Nationalists-largely-were-behind-the-bombing-of-national-monuments/1233408171600/, accessed: 20.01.2019.}
\end{thebibliography}
Z7. demonstration of force in physical space (e.g. the occupation of a building in Aleria in 1975 by Corsican separatists\textsuperscript{71} or the island of Alcatraz by the American Indian Movement 1969–1971\textsuperscript{72}, demonstration funerals of IRA fighters\textsuperscript{73}, the INLA street parade in Belfast in 2015\textsuperscript{74} or virtual (e.g. placing your message on a non-friend website\textsuperscript{75});

Z8. propaganda campaign (periodicals\textsuperscript{76}, leaflets\textsuperscript{77}, inscriptions on walls, internet propaganda\textsuperscript{78} and others).

In addition, terrorist organisations also undertake actions aimed at maintaining and reproducing their own forces (although they have at least partly a propaganda dimension):

Z9. defensive clashes with law enforcement forces (during arrests, raids, chases, etc.\textsuperscript{79});

Z10. assaults on traitors and interlocutors (e.g. Gapon’s pop by Russian socialist revolutionaries in 1906\textsuperscript{80} or the dissident fascist Stelescu by Romanian iron guards in 1936\textsuperscript{81});

Z11. recapture of its members (e.g. A. Baader in 1970; also, the apparently “offensive” abduction of H.M. Schleyer in 1977 was aimed at freeing imprisoned RAF members\textsuperscript{82});

Z12. expropriations (robberies) (e.g. the action under Bezdany in 1908\textsuperscript{83});

Z13. helping imprisoned members\textsuperscript{84}.

A terrorist attack is generally carried out by the organisation/movement on behalf of which it was carried out (a side-effect is that different

\textsuperscript{71} Bielecki R, *op. cit.*., pp. 124–126.


\textsuperscript{76} E.g. The People’s Liberation Front, active in the early 1990s in Poland, published a magazine “Wybór Polityczny” — a copy in the author’s possession.


\textsuperscript{78} Fisher A, *Swarmscast, How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence*. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2015, No. 3.


\textsuperscript{81} Dubicki T, Dach K, *Żelazny Legion Michała Archangiola*. Warsaw, 1996, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{82} Moszczeński J, Wagrowska M, 50 dni grozy. Warsaw, 1978, pp. 7–19.

\textsuperscript{83} Lada W, Polscy terroryści. Krakow, 2014, pp. 75–79.

\textsuperscript{84} For this purpose, entire structures are created such as Anarchist Black Cross. “ACK Biuletyn Informacyjny” 1997–2002, 2007.
organisations admit to having carried out one attack – e.g. the Istanbul attack on 6 September 1986 was carried out by eight organisations. However, it is not uncommon for assaults to be carried out anonymously or under a false flag (to discredit the opponent).

### Direct effect

The direct result of terrorist assassinations may be:

1. **Disruption** of the opponent’s structures (e.g. the state apparatus) as a result of the elimination of leaders [Z1] and/or decimation of officers [Z2]. This effect has never been achieved by terrorists, but it was planned by 19th-century Russian nationalists;

2. **Weaknesses** in the human resources potential [Z2] and economic potential [Z5] of the opponent by making him/her lose as much as possible. The Soviet losses in Afghanistan (although terrorism was only an auxiliary activity of the Mujahedeen) reached 15,000 dead, the Soviet Army also lost a lot of equipment;

3. **Breakdown** of the enemy’s morale or background. A classic example of this is the defeat of the USA in the Vietnam War (although the terrorist actions of the Viet Cong had in its case a secondary character in relation to the rural partisans);

4. **Discrediting** the opponent (e.g. showing that the government is not able to effectively prevent an attack [Z1–7]) in the eyes of public opinion. Every chronic terrorist activity confirms the validity of Henry Kissinger’s thesis: “The guerrilla wins if he doesn’t lose. The conventional army loses if it doesn’t win.”;

5. Increase in the **popularity** of the terrorists [Z6–8]—especially in conditions of strong social polarisation (hostility to the authorities [Z1–2] or a foreign community [Z3]). Since the times of Carlo Pisacane, “propaganda by deed” has been the basic principle of terrorism. A Polish Radio and Television correspondent described the increase in prestige of the Red Brigades after Moro’s kidnapping, as a result of which young lumpenproletarians “joined the organisation for various motives, also to add splendour

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85 Tomasiewicz J, Terroryzm..., op. cit., p. 10.
90 Grinberg D, op. cit., p. 220.
to themselves, to gain success with pretty girls. A member of the PPS, in his diary, explained this psychological mechanism in the following way: “When from time to time some spike [...] got a beating, the socialists were feared like a fire, and at the same time their seriousness and sympathy in the masses grew. [...] People are always impressed by power.”

B6. **Provoking** the opponent’s repression [Z1–3], which is to lead to an escalation of the conflict. This tactic proved its worth in the case of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), which deliberately attacked European settlers (including women and children) so that the blind retaliation of the French army would lead to an increase in the dissatisfaction of the Muslim population and their ultimate involvement in the insurgent struggle.

B7. Making the society **chaotic** and anonymous [Z1–5]. This goal has also never been achieved at full scale by terrorists, although they have sometimes approached it (as in Italy in the “lead years”).

It should be noted that direct effects affect each other, because e.g. disorganisation of the enemy forces [B1–2] or chaos [B6] facilitating the actions of terrorists may lead to an escalation of the conflict [B6], and vice versa. The political discreditation of the opponent [B4] contributes both to the increase in popularity of the terrorists [B5] and to the weakening of his forces [B2] (e.g. the withdrawal of support for Batista by the capital in the calculation of the threat by Castro’s forces). Generally speaking: the physical and moral disintegration of the opponent’s forces [B1–3] and its disgrace [B4] leads to chaos [B7], while if this is accompanied by an increase in popularity (and thus forces) of the terrorists [B5], we are dealing with an escalation of the conflict [B6].

**Indirect effect**

The direct impact of an attack is generally not yet a premise for achieving the final objective. Theoretically, the paralysis of the power apparatus and social chaos may lead to the collapse of power as a whole, which is the ultimate goal of anarchists, but in practice, this has never happened. It is realistic to force partial reforms in the frames of the system (the establishment of a canton of the Jury—which was the goal of, among others, the terrorists from the Front for Challenging the Jury—within the Swiss Confederation has not changed its system), although, as a rule, terrorist actions accompany a wider social movement (e.g. the environmental movement). However, assassinations alone are not enough to gain power.

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in the sense of taking control of the territory, which is the goal of most terrorists. Therefore, the direct effects of an attack only allow us to move on to the next stage, when strictly terrorist actions will be ancillary.

Terrorist attacks are intended to escalate social and political conflict and/or chaos. When the escalation of the conflict results in a relative balance of power between the authorities and the terrorists, the latter’s activities have a chance to grow into a (short-term) mass armed uprising [P1] or a (long-term) civil war [P2]. The transition stage in conditions of relative balance may also be a state of dual authority [P3], consisting in the control of terrorists over part of the territory (the no-go zones in Ulster 1969–1972, the situation in Tehran in 1979, the “Shia rule” in the Cairo district of Heliopolis in 1988). This armed revolution may end in defeat (as in the case of the Tamil Tigers), victory (Iran) or negotiation and compromise (Maoist “People’s War” in Nepal).

If the society and its institutions are disintegrated and paralysed, but the terrorist forces remain relatively small, a revolutionary coup d’état [P4] (Portugal 1974) or, on the contrary, a return to the status quo ante (Chile 1973) will be the way to achieve the ultimate goal. Terrorists may also act to provoke or facilitate external intervention [P5], as was the case with the Sudetendeutsches Freikorps. A possible solution is also the resignation of a weakened and discredited government [P6], which leads to a change in the political system e.g. through elections (such a situation occurred in Chile, despite the fact that the actions of FPMR terrorists were of secondary importance here). Terrorist actions may

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98 For the Egyptian jihadists, the assassination of President Sadat was supposed to be a signal of the outbreak of an armed uprising, but it ended in a fiasco. Zdanowski J., Bracia Muzułmanie i inni. Szczecin, 1986, pp. 143–145.


100 Giełżyński W., op. cit., pp. 149–154, 161.


104 Iwiński T., Portugalia na zakrècie historii. Warsaw, 1975, pp. 82–84, 103–104.

105 Labarca Goddard E., Chile w czerwić. Warsaw, 1973, pp. 10–63.


in this case accompany a wider social movement (e.g. civil disobedience campaigns, general strikes) paving the way for other forces as in the case of the 1905 revolution in Russia (although this was rather unintended\textsuperscript{108}). The authorities, unable to defeat the terrorists, may also start negotiations with them [P7], which will lead to at least partial achievement of the terrorists’ goals (Oslo Agreement\textsuperscript{109}).

**Examples of strategy**

The various combinations of these elements: assaults, direct and indirect effects, and final objectives form the strategic plan of a terrorist organisation. The different elements are interdependent — e.g. a dictatorship, for which an active minority will suffice; in this case, attacks on random people are more likely. These correlations, however, only result in an increased probability, not absolute determination (e.g. despite their misanthropic ideology, ecoterrorists are shying away from fatalities). The opposite effect should also be borne in mind: the ideology is also influenced by the conditions in which the terrorists operate, e.g. isolated groups may be willing to accept elitist concepts (see the insurrectionists-nihilists).

As an example, let us try to reconstruct the strategy of the Italian Red Brigades (BR). This organisation was relatively well rooted in Italian society: the number of active supporters of left-wing terrorism was estimated at 10,000, while a certain proportion of young people in education and unskilled workers (red-white foremen were elected to works councils) passively sympathised with them\textsuperscript{110}. This allowed the BR to outline an ambitious strategic plan, assuming a phased armed revolution [C2]. The Red Brigades said straightforwardly, “What do we want? We want power!”\textsuperscript{111}. This was supposed to lead to a gradual escalation of terrorist attacks. In the first phase, the so-called “armed propaganda” (Italian: propaganda armata) was to support the local spontaneous fight of the workers. Only material (rather symbolic) attacks were carried out [Z6] and bloodless attacks on enemies, which included activists of hostile political groups and lower and middle economic staff [Z2]\textsuperscript{112}. In phase two, the terrorists began to mutilate and kill their political opponents, while at the same time starting

\textsuperscript{108} Pipes D, op. cit., pp. 3–40.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 11; Sundquist V.H, Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red Brigades. Journal of Strategic Security, 2010, No. 3, p. 58; de Graaf B, op. cit., s. 9–10; Buckingham, op. cit., p. 25
attacks on state officials. In the third phase, the BR decided to strike “a blow to the heart of the state” i.e. the representatives of the political and military elite [Z1], which resulted, among others, in the kidnapping of A. Moro and General James Dozier.

On the one hand, these actions were to lead to an increase in the repression of the state, so that the working class would free itself from “reformist illusions”. [B6] Recognising that the “organisation of violence is a necessity of class struggle” [115], on the other hand, to the increase in popularity of the extreme left [B5], which in turn was to have an imitation effect. There would be a “militarisation of class struggle” (a term formulated by the RAF in 1972), i.e. the spread of political violence on the streets, in factories, and in universities (which in 1976–1978 did indeed happen to a significant extent) [117]. The creation of local proletarian “counterpower” (contropotere) bodies would lead to a de facto diarchy (a system of double government) [P3]. Mass political violence would finally turn into a Maoist-type “people’s civil war” [P2], as a result of which, a revolutionary proletariat would establish its dictatorship under the leadership of the “fighting communist party” (partito comunista combatante) or Red Brigades. This strategy was subordinated to the organisational structure of the BR as a centralised “armed party”. Characteristically, the Red Brigades—unlike for example the RAF or Action Directe—focused on the Italian perspective.

This is just one of the options for a terrorist strategy. The West German and French comrades of the Red Brigadiers, with much weaker public support, pursued a strategy that is both more ambitious and more vague. In their vision, Western Europe was only one of the theatres of the global revolution [C2] – “the global struggle between the international

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113 Sundquist V.H, op. cit., p. 57; de Graaf B, op. cit., pp. 10–11; Buckingham, op. cit., pp. 27–28. At the same time, the spectrum of opponents has expanded: they were no longer only representatives of the extreme right wing, but also the Christian Democrats and even activists of the mainstream Italian Communist Party like Guido Rossa. The Red Brigades..., op. cit., p. 23.  
115 Orsini A, op. cit., p. 16.  
116 The Red Army..., op. cit., p. 139.  
proletariat and the imperialist bourgeoisie”121. The basic front of this battle was located on the “outskirts” of the imperialist system, i.e. in the Third World (Vietnam, Palestine, Africa, Latin America) exploited by the “metropolis” of world capitalism (the USA, Japan and Western Europe, with Germany at the forefront)122. The Third World People’s Masses were the avant-garde of the revolution, in relation to which the Western revolutionaries had only an ancillary role123. According to the RAF, “the fight in the metropolis is the fight of the international brigades of the People’s War [that is] in Quang Tri and Hue [villages in Vietnam – J.T.], Palestine, [...] Angola”124. Their task was to transfer this fight to Western countries by attacking the apparatus [Z1–2] and infrastructure [Z5] of the opponent in order to physically and psychologically weaken [B2–3] its forces; an additional goal was to popularise the terrorist cause [B5]125. A critical evaluation of the German working class (“imperialist workers’ aristocracy”) participating in the exploitation of the Third World126 led to seeking support from marginal groups of the “subproletariat” and ethically motivated students127. It is not clear whether the final revolution in the metropolis was predicted by way of civil war [P2] (Baader mentioned the formation of “regular units of the Red Army in the People’s War”128) or external intervention [P5].

At the same time, the Italian far right pursued the so-called “tension strategy” (strategia della tensione) based on the doctrine of “revolutionary war” (guerre révolutionnaire) developed in the 1950s by the V Psychological Action Bureau of the French army based on the experience of Viet Minh and FLN129. Neo-fascist terrorists carried out attacks on random people [Z4] (“crowd shooting”) such as the 1980 Bologna station bombing130. As Mario Tuti, one of the terrorists, justified: “to shake the inert masses, it is sometimes necessary to hit them blindly”131, while Guido Giannettini explained in his textbook “Tecniche della guerra rivoluzionaria” that both indiscriminate and selective terrorism is intended to “provoke severe retaliation, which will increase tension, creating an irreversible phenomenon leading to civil war”132. Another document from the circle

123 Ibid., pp. 219, 222.
124 Ibid., p. 226.
125 Ibid., p. 98.
126 Ibid., pp. 126, 207, 214.
127 Ibid., pp. 82, 89–92, 101.
128 Ibid., p. 121.
130 Cento B, Italian..., op. cit., p. 9.
of neo-fascist “black internationalism” leaves no doubt: “We believe that the first phase of our political action should create chaos in all power structures. [...] the first action we should take is the de-structuring of state institutions under the cover of communist and Maoist activity.”

That is why many acts of terror under the “tension strategy” (since the attack on Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969) were conducted as false flag operations. In this way, Italy would be brought to the edge of chaos, which would lead to paralysis of the democratic state and create social consent to carry out a right-wing coup d’état and establish an anti-revolutionary regime. In 1970, the Italian Republic found itself one step ahead of such a coup.

Other strategies can be seen in the activities of insurrectionists, ecologists, Islamists, white racists and Kurdish separatists. However, one can risk the claim that each of them uses the elements listed in this article.

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134 Cento Bull, Italian..., op. cit., pp. 34–35
135 Ibid., p. 37. In Italian neo-fascist circles, there was also an alternative strategy of an anti-organic “alliance of extremes” formulated by Franco Fred in his book “La disintegrazione del sistema” (see: Electronic source: https://disintegrationofthesystem.wordpress.com/, accessed: 16.04.2016); Cf: Cento Bull, Italian..., op. cit., p. 140.
136 McKenzie Bale, op. cit., pp. 250–460. A separate issue is the role of special services and paramilitary structures such as Nuclei par la Defesa dello Stato—According to Cento Bull, the neo-fascist militia were only an operational level and not a decision-making level of the “na-five strategy”. Cento Bull, Italian..., op. cit., pp. 35, 38. See: Ganser D, NATO’s Secret Armies, London—New York 2005. pp. 63–83.
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Summary: The article is an attempt to create an instrument for evaluating long-term terrorist strategy. The author analyses the categories of terrorist attacks, direct effects, indirect effects and final goals. He also reconstructs some terrorist strategies.